Recent Decisions by Castelli, John C. et al.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 7
2-1-1949
Recent Decisions
John C. Castelli
Edward G. Coleman
Arthur B. Curran
John L. Globensky
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Castelli, Edward G. Coleman, Arthur B. Curran & John L. Globensky, Recent Decisions, 24 Notre Dame L. Rev. 242 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol24/iss2/7
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ciple of "separation of powers", it certainly is not so because of its
antiquity, as has been noted previously. If any defense is to be made,
it must be that this power is somehow essential to the exercise of the
judicial function. Experience seems to prove the contrary. The fed-
eral courts, as well as some state courts, have for quite a few years
been divested of the power to punish indirect contempts by publication,
and there is as yet no evidence of any disruption of judicial processes.
It is, of course, not difficult to imagine a situation where the power
of contemnor could be so great as to actually influence a court in its de-
cision of a pending case, but it can then be asked: How effective is the
exercise of the contempt power in removing this pressure? If a judge
is not possessed of sufficient fortitude to defy the pressure of adverse
criticism, how is the exercise of a power which is certain to bring him
more adverse criticism, particularly in the voting booth, going to allevi-
ate the situation?
John H. O'Hara.
RECENT DECISIONS
DIvoRc--FAiuaa To MEET RESIDENcE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE ATrACxED
iN CoLLATERAL ACTION.-Schillerst7om v. Schillerstrom, .... N.D ..... 32 N.W. (2d)
106 (1948). The issue presented in this case was whether or not the trial court in
North Dakota had jurisdiction to hear and determine this action for divorce when
the plaintiff had not met North Dakota's residence requirements: "A divorce
must not be granted, unless the plaintiff in good faith has been a resident of the
state for twelve months next preceding the commencement of the action." NoRar
DAXoTA REvIsED CODE § 14-0517 (1943).
Plaintiff was a native of North Dakota, and had lived in Mercer County
until she went to Fargo to attend school. She was in Fargo when she married
the defendant, a native and resident of Moorhead, Minnesota. Through the mar-
riage, plaintiff assumed by operation of law the domicil of her husband. After
the marriage, she continued to attend school in Fargo. later working there. The
couple did not immediately set up permanent living quarters, but lived in rooms,
moving from time to time. Later they established permanent residence in Fargo,
while defendant continued to work in Moorhead, which adjoins Fargo. Marital
difficulties arose and they separated, plaintiff returning to her parents' home in
Mercer County, North Dakota. After a short reconciliation, during which a
child was born, the parties again separated and this action for divorce was insti-
tuted by plaintiff.
The district (trial) court granted the divorce, but later (under a new judge,
the trial judge having died in the meantime) sustained a motion to vacate the
judgment. The trial court based this ruling on the ground "that jurisdiction had
not been acquired over the subject matter for the reason that the plaintiff had
not been domiciled within this State 'for twelve months next preceding the com-
mencement of the action' as required by Section 14-0517 . . ." The plaintiff
below appealed to the supreme court from the ruling on the motion to vacate.
The supreme court here reversed the ruling, thus reinstating the original judgment
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granting a divorce. The supreme court held that the statutory requirement of
duration of residence ("length of residence" and "length of domiciP" were used
synonymously by the statute; this confusion will be discussed below) did not
impose a restriction on the court to "hear and determine" an action for divorce,
but merely limits the authority of the court to "grant" a divorce. Since a motion
to vacate judgment on the grounds of no jurisdiction is a collateral attack, it is
not a proper method of appealing the question of length of residence, and, since
here the statutory time for appeal had elapsed, the judgment of the trial court
must stand. It appeared that the plaintiff had not actually resided in North
Dakota for the statutory period.
The jurisdiction to hear and determine an action is conferred on the district
court by § 103 of the North Dakota Constitution, reading: "The district court
shall have original jurisdiction, except as otherwise provided in this constitution,
for all causes both at law and equity and such appellate jurisdiction as may be
conferred by law." This provision clearly includes actions for divorce.
After first having determined that plaintiff here had established her "domicil"
in North Dakota as a matter of fact, prior to the commencement of the divorce
action, by physical residence there and intent to reside there, the court dis-
cussed the general principles upon which it rested its decision. Domicil, said the
court, is a jurisdictional fact under the full faith and credit clause, and extra-
territorial effect will be given only if a divorce decree is based upon domicil.
Domicil is, indeed, a federal restriction on the state courts. Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1903). Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945). But the added requirement of
length or duration of residence, where actual domicil exists, is not such a juris-
dictional fact unless the state of the forum so makes it. With this requirement,
whatever it be, the full faith and credit clause is not concerned. By jurisdictional
in this sense is meant the power to hear and determine the case. Consequently,
finding facts as to duration of residence comes within the scope of the state
constitutional authority given to the court, and, if the finding is erroneous, the
error does not go to the power to hear and determine the action. The error is
one of exercise of jurisdiction only, and the judgment is not subject to collateral
attack. There must be a proper appeal of the case in order to obtain a reversal
of the first judgment.
Therefore, when the plaintiff had established domicil, the court obtained
jurisdiction to hear and determine the action brought by her for divorce. The
question of domicil was one of fact-actual residence plus the intent to reside
in North Dakota. This the plaintiff had. The power to hear the case devolved
upon the court from the constitutional provision quoted above. The particular
length of time required by North Dakota as necessary residence prior to bringing
a divorce action was irrelevant to the court's power to hear and determine the
case, affecting alone the power to grant a divorce. The faulty finding of fact to
the effect that plaintiff had been a resident of the state for twelve months next
preceding the action was an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not in
excess of it. Plaintiff's comings and goings to and from North Dakota should
have barred her from receiving a divorce, since she apparently did not reside
in the state "for twelve months next preceding the action", but they had no
effect upon the court's power to hear the action, once her domicil, indicated by
her presence and state of mind, was proved as a fact. Plaintiff regarded North
Dakota as home throughout her wanderings. Therefore, North Dakota courts
could hear her case.
A difficulty in reading this case was that, throughout the discussion of
"domicil and length of residence" by the court, the -two terms were used inter-
changeably. The confusion was a product not of the judge but of the statute
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which spoke of length of domicil as synonymous with length of residence. The
judge followed the statute and used the two terms interchangeably. He had
previously made the distinctions quite dear, however, by an excellent discussion
of the actual meanings of the two terms. This clarity was somewhat befogged
later, when the judge sometimes used the terms correctly, not in the equivalent
sense of the statute, without indicating that he was doing so.
A proper interpretation of the two terms is, however, of the utmost importance
in clarifying the legal issues involved. For when it is once understood that
domicil, as a matter of fact, depends upon residence only in an evidentiary sense,
so that length of residence is merely additional proof of domicil, the holding and
reasoning of the court at once become easily appreciated. Further, considerable
confusion can be caused from an indiscriminate mingling of the two meanings
of "residence"-one, as evidentiary of domicil, and two, in its strict statutory
sense in reference to divorce actions. In this latter sense, residence for the pur-
poses of divorce is not acquired until the statutory period has been met, although
the plaintiff may have been an inhabitant of the state for several months.
The respondent relied upon two incorrect interpretations of the meaning of
domicil, urging that residence for the statutory period was a jurisdictional re-
quirement in the sense that it was necessary for the court to hear and determine
the case. The respondent cited Smith v. Smith, 7 N.D. 404, 75 N.W. 783 (1898)
which seemed to hold, and said,
The statement requiring residence, which means domicil (sic) for a
period of 90 days, as preliminary to starting an action for a divorce, is
jurisdictional to the subject matter. Until this preliminary proof is
made, the trial court obtains no authority to move in the action.
The Smith case was subsequently affirmed on rehearing, the court seeming to
hold a like conclusion.
In Graham v. Graham, 9 N.D. 88, 81 N.W. 44 (1899), the court apparently
held that, because the petitioner had not been a resident of the state for 90 days
prior to instituting the action, the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.
The instant case disposed of the contrary expressions in the above cases by
an attempt to distinguish them on the ground that in those cases a trial de novo
was sought, while here a collateral attack on the judgment was being made;
therefore, the term jurisdiction in the Smith and Graham cases did not mean
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, but meant only that the court did
not have the authority, termed jurisdiction, to grant the divorce. At any event,
said the court, any expressions in those two cases which were contrary to the
present holding were dicta. It is interesting to note that the court, proceeding
carefully, discussed at length, with citations, its reasons for dismissing its previous
dicta, and the reasons for disregarding dicta as a general principle where the dicta
conflict with the present holding.
The court cited decisions from other jurisdictions which are in accord with
the holding in the Schillerstrom case: Kern v. Field, 68 Minn. 317, 71 N.W. 393,
64 Am.St.Rep. 497 (1897), citing Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W.
1017 (1894); DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal. (2d) 521, 165 P. (2d) 457, 459 (1946);
Aucutt v. Ascutt, 122 Tex. 518, 62 S.W. (2d) 77 (1933). The logic in these cases
would seem to support the instant court's interpretation as a correct one, although
the view may not find universal accord.
While it is clear that the present case did not present a controversy involving
separate sovereignties, so as directly to involve the full faith and credit clause,
the holding seems to indicate that a sister state, in a collateral action, cannot
question the jurisdiction of the state of the action over the res, where domicil
has in fact been established, as shown by intent, regardless of whether or not
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the condition of length of residence has been met. Citing Davis v. Davis, 315
U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938), the court said,
... in divorce actions, in so far as the full faith and credit clause is
concerned, a decision of a state court upon the issue of domicil is res
judicata if such issue has'been litigated in an actual contest.
An interesting question is raised whether, in a case directly involving two separate
sovereignties, the expressions in the instant case might be regarded as dicta. It is
submitted that they would at least carry great force. This decision restates
many of the principles laid down in the Williams case, and is a clarification of
the law of North Dakota. While its actual binding effect, for purposes of future
litigation, would seem to be only in a case where a domestic collateral attack
is made on a similar judgment, its reasoning transcends the boundaries of North
Dakota and domestic attacks, and should be taken into serious account in a case
involving two sister states.
The opinion is a very complete discussion of the law on the subject. The
treatment of the question of domicil and jurisdiction is particularly meritorious; in-
deed, the court, seeming to realize the importance of settling the issue, examined
minutely each proposition presented to it and carefully annotated its conclusions.
Such procedure is necessary in the decision of such murky questions of law as
those presented in this case.
The American law of divorce has been so long in a great state of confusion
that none profess to be able to see the road out. It is the belief of many that
the only way out is a uniform divorce law. Naturally, such a solution must be
long in coming, if it ever arrives at all. Until then, palliatives alone must pre-
vent a further disintegration of the law of this subject. The instant opinion is
an example of the responsibility felt by thoughtful courts toward the problem,
and is at least a clarification of the law of one state. Of course, the correct way
out is a realization of the true nature of matrimony. But this realization is still
more impossible of attainment than the proposed uniform law. It is not a
blanket acceptance of pragmatism to encourage courts to ameliorate the situation
in so far as they can under existing concepts. On the contrary, even the most
sanguine advocates of rigid divorce laws can do no better at the present than
to encourage what seems to be the immediate end of legal effort, a further
clarification and unification of existing law. One cannot reach the ultimate goal
without removing the obstacles in the preliminary paths.
John C. Castelli
ADmnsmTRAIvE LAW-JUDICIAL RIviEw or ADnuwzsmvvT n AcioN.-Unger v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Ill. 1948). This case came upon a petition
for review of a decision of a government administrative agency, the Veterans
Administration, asking for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff was entitled
to be granted insurance under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940,
54 STAT. 1008 (1940), as amended by -the Insurance Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 781,
38 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1946).
The plaintiff, William H. Unger, after being honorably discharged from the
army in 1941, re-enlisted in June, 1944, and was again honorably discharged in
January, 1946. In April, 1946, he was observed to have several masses on his
neck, which were diagnosed as "Hodgkins disease". Upon proper application
Unger was granted a pension by the Veterans Administration for 60 per cent
disability in July, 1947. Shortly thereafter he applied for $10,000 National
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Service Life Insurance, paying the necessary premiums at that time, and in Febru-
ary, 1948, was notified that his application could not be accepted. The rejection
was based upon a determination of the Veterans Administration, that for insur-
ance purposes his disease had not been incurred in or aggravated by military
service.
Thus the Administrator had found that for pension purposes the plaintiff had
a service-connected disability, but that for insurance purposes, the disability was
not service-connected.
The plaintiff based his contention upon an amendment to the National Service
Life Insurance Act of 1940, which amendment, enacted in 1946 as § 802 (c) (2)
states that:
Any individual who has had active service between October 8, 1940,
and September 2, 1945, both dates inclusive, shall be granted such insur-
ance upon application therefor in writing . . . and evidence satisfactory
to the Administrator showing such person to be in good health at the
time of such application. In any case in which application for life or
disability insurance or for reinstatement of such insurance is made prior
to January 1, 1950, the Administrator shall not deny, for the purposes
of this section . . . that the applicant is in good health because of any
disability or disabilities, less than total in degree, resulting from or aggra-
vated by such active service. . . 60 STAT. 781, 38 U.S.C. 802 (c) (2)
(1946).
Prior to the enactment of this subparagraph in 1946, the Administrator was
not permitted to issue policies of insurance to such disabled persons who did not
at that time have then in effect such insurance. The addition of subparagraph (2)
to paragraph (c) of § 802 dearly made it possible for him to do so.
Despite this amendment, the government contended that under the rules
established by the courts governing administrative process, and the interpretation
by those courts of relevant statutes, the plaintiff is not entitled to judicial review
of this decision. They also state that under the Federal Declaratory judgment
Act, the government must first consent to such action.
With reference to the first point advanced by the defendant concerning the
plaintiff's right to judicial review, the court pointed out that in 1946 the National
Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 was amended by a revision of § 808 of this
same chapter to read:
Except in the event of suit as provided in section 817 of this title,
or other appropriate court proceedings, all decisions rendered by the Ad-
ministrator under the provisions of this chapter, or regulations properly
issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on all questions
of law or fact, and no other official of The United States except a judge
or judges of United States Courts, shall have jurisdiction to review any
such decisions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 817, as amended in 1946 also, permits suit based on this chapter
to be brought in the same manner provided for in §§ 445 and 551 as to con-
verted life insurance. These provisions apply, however, only to a contract of
insurance already in existence, not having lapsed or needing reinstatement at the
time the suit is brought. Since the plaintiff in the instant case brings his suit upon
an original application for a contract of insurance, the provisions of §§ 817, 445
and 551 would not have given him the right to judicial review. Before the amend-
ment to § 808 the court would have been expressly precluded from entertaining
jurisdiction in this case.
Prior to 1946, § 808 of Title 38 definitely precluded the right of an individual
to judicial review of a decision based on this chapter, for it originally read:
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Except in the event of suit as provided in section 817 of this title, all
decisions rendered by the Administrator under the provisions of this
chapter, or regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall be final, and con-
clusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to review any such decisions.
In comparing this original section with the same section as amended (pre-
viously stated), it becomes obvious that by the addition of the terms, "or other
appropriate court proceedings", "properly issued" and "except a judge or judges
of the United States Courts" judicial review was not only permitted but advo-
cated. In the only case to date decided on this point, Zazove v. United States,
.... U.S. _., 68 S.Ct. 1284 (1948), Mr. Chief Justice Vinson states that through
the use of these tautological phrases it is clear that Congress intended more than
a casual judicial scrutiny of decisions given under this statute. Although the facts
of the Zazove case differed materially from those presented to us in the instant
case, the question of judicial review there arose, and review was granted.
Turning to the next point advanced by the defendant as to the lack of con-
sent of the government to a declaratory judgment action in this case, the court
stated that the provisions of § 808 render inapplicable the non-consent clause
of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act as to this suit.
Having thus dearly demonstrated the right of the present plaintiff to judicial
review of the administrative decision, the court further substantiates its position
by pointing out a similar right the plaintiff would have had under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009 (1946), to review
of administrative process. Section 1009 begins:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion-
(a) Right of review
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
Thus under this Act, unless the statute expressly or impliedly precludes it by
leaving it to the discretion of the agency, judicial review is available.
It is interesting to note that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 became
law just a few weeks prior to the enactment of the amendment to Section 808 of
Title 38, U.S.C. If this amendment had not been enacted, the plaintiff would
not have had the right to judicial review under the Administrative Act, since the
statute as originally written did expressly preclude such review. Since, however,
the amendment to § 808 indicated a vague congressional intent to give the right
of review to the courts, resort to the Administrative Procedure Act was in this
case unnecessary.
Thus we have here presented once again the highly important question of when
judicial review of administrative process is to be permitted. By objective observa-
tion and integration of the various clauses of the insurance statute here being
construed, the court has endeavored, and ably so, to arrive at the intent behind
the law. The statute as originally written expressly precluded judicial review,
but as rewritten by the insertion of certain phrases in the amendment, this pre-
clusion of review, under the court's interpretation, was obviously eliminated. Due
to the wide range of jurisdiction of many government agencies, statutes enabling
them to exercise control over that jurisdiction must cover a wide range. Out of
this attempt at all-covering legislation, we have seen arise quite often, not only
irregularity and inconsistency of policy, but at times embarrassment and utter
confusion in the various legal channels. The present case is an example of intelli-
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gent judicial appraisal of what is essentially a functional problem: namely, the
problem of how to achieve continuing effective government through the proper
allocation of the judicial process and the administrative process. Here the court
preferred "a solution to a slogan."
Despite its apparent antiquity, administrative law has become only recently
a major concern of the Supreme Court. With the widening of the range of
administration of government agencies, administrative law must of necessity extend
its tenets to cover that range. This it can do only by judicial and legislative
cognizance of the complexities of modern life requiring a considerable degree of
government regulation, for even the most perfect law is not self-executing. Techno-
logical progress in our society will continue to present problems and situations
similar to the one at hand, and courts must continue to meet them with a feeling
of amelioration rather than distrust and suppression. Congress must of necessity
legislate to meet changing conditions and the courts need not have a pragmatic
sanction to interpret such legislation in the same light.
Edward G. Coleman
CONSTITUTioNAL LAw-NoN-ConMrUNIST ArzmAViT PROVISION or THE TAFT-
HARTLEY AcT.-Inland Steel Company v. National Labor Relations Board, .... F.
(2d) ...., (C.C.A. 7th 1948), 17 L.W. 2132 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1948). This case holds
that § 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the Taft-Hartley
Act, which requires union officers to file non-communist affidavits before their
union may use the processes of the National Labor Relations Board, is not invalid
as a violation of speech or political belief.
The facts of the instant case are that the petitioner (Inland Steel Company)
appealed from an order of the National Labor Relations Board to the effect that
upon compliance by the union with § 9(f), (g) and (h) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, the company must bargain collectively with the union con-
cerning a retirement and pension plan. The union (United Steel Workers of
America) was permitted to intervene and join the Board in defense of the order
but attacks that part of the order which makes compliance with § 9(h) of the
Act a prerequisite before the company is required to bargain with the union.
Subsections (f) and (g) of § 9 deal with the requirement that the union annually
file a financial statement and organizational data. With these requirements the
union complied and none are pertinent here but § 9(h) which the union contended
is unconstitutional. The court unanimously affirmed the Board's order that the
company bargain with the union on the subject of a retirement and pension plan
but split on the question of the validity of the controversial § 9(h). 61 STAr.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 159 (Supp. 1948). The pertinent section provides that:
(h) No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by
a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no pettiion
under subsection (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no com-
plaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization
under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file
with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the
preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization
and the officers of any national or international labor organization of
which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of
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the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does
not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization
that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Govern-
ment by force or any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions
of Section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to
such affidavits.
Section 35 A of the Criminal Code provides that falsification of such affidavits
is punishable by a fine of $10,000 or ten years in prison or both. 35 STAT.
1095 (1909), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 85 (1946).
Justice Kerner, in the majority opinion, after recognizing that a law denying
a person the right to earn a living because of race, religion or belief would be
unconstitutional, Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552,
67 S.Ct. 910, 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947), goes on to say:
It is to be borne in mind that the Act was not passed because Con-
gress disapproved of the views and beliefs of Communists, but because
Congress recognized that the practices of persons who entertained the
views presently to be discussed, might not use the powers and benefits
conferred by the Act for the purposes intended by Congress ...
Congress has the power to withhold benefits which it confers for the
accomplishment of legitimate purposes within its constitutional power
from those who, it has cause to believe, may utilize these beliefs for
directly opposite purposes.
The majority pointed to National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146
(D.C.D.C. 1948), 16 L.W. 2501 (U.S. April 20, 1948) which decided this same
question on April 13, 1948, that subsections (f), (g) and (h) of § 9 were con-
stitutional; that Congress had the right to make these provisions conditions prece-
dent to the enjoyment of the statutorially created privileges of being the exclusive
bargaining agent.
Important in the consideration of the present case is the fact that, apart
from the National Labor Relations Act, no Union has the right to be
exclusive bargaining Agent. That extraordinary privilege is extended by
the statute and except for the Act, employers are not under compulsion
to bargain collectively.
In that case Justice Miller listed analogous cases which held conditions
precedent valid or prerequisite to the enjoyment of a statutory privilege as long
as the conditions were not "whimsical". Two of these cases are: Electric Bond
and Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 678,
82 L.Ed. 936 (1938), and Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42
L.Ed. 1002 (1898). In the former, the S.E.C. brought suit to enforce §§ 4(a) and
5 of the Public Utilities Holding Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79(d) and (e) (1946), which provide for registration of holding companies with
the S.E.C. and prohibit the use of the mail and the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce for those who fail to comply. This condition was upheld as valid
by Chief Justice Hughes. Again in the latter case a New York statute pro-
hibited the practice of medicine by one who had been convicted of a felony.
This was held constitutional on the grounds that a sovereign may require good
character as a condition to the practicing of a profession or a trade that is
charged with public interest.
It is of interest to note that the Supreme Court, on June 21, 1948, affirmed
without opinion the Herzog decision, 334 U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 1529, 92 L.Ed. 1479
(1948), in so far as (b) and (g) of § 9 were concerned but did not decide the
validity of § 9 (h). Since our highest judicial oracle has not spoken on this section,
we might say that the two lower court decisions in the Inland Steel case and the
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Herzog case are only presumptive evidence of the validity of this disputed section,
especially in view of the vigorous dissent in both cases.
The majority opinions in each case discussed the "dear and present danger"
test; however, neither considered it controlling but rather used the condition
precedent argument that was considered above. The former is the famous test
of Mr. Justice Holmes set out in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct.
247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919).
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress had a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
This might well be decisive, if and when the Supreme Court considers this
question; that is, whether the threat to our national interest from Communist-
dominated unions is sufficient to come within Mr. Justice Holmes' test. It must
be remembered that at least four of the present Court are jealous guardians of
the First Amendment and are wont to hold that the presumption of validity is
against legislation that treads within the purview of this amendment. To wit:
in Thomas v. Collins, 323 US. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1944), it is said:
For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits
any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press". It must be
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read
in contacts of a liberty-loving society, will allow.
While it is true that in Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (C.C.A. D.C.
1948), the Communist ideology was held a sufficient potential menace to justify
congressional inquiry into that subject, yet investigation and legislation are dis-
tinct fields and the Court may well be more stringent in viewing the latter.
The Court could decide this question on -the "bad tendency" doctrine estab-
lished in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 625, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925),
which has never been expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court, and would
permit a legislature to strike at "substantial" dangers to the state, whether immi-
nent or remote. 48 CoL. L. REv. 258 (1949).
Justice Major, in his dissent, felt that this section was too uncertain to be
enforceable. The term "officer" is not defined by the Act and the term "affiliated"
with the Communist Party is perhaps too vague a criterion. As was said in
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939),
There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelli-
gence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The
vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope
of the act.
It might well be that because of change in our national policy, the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 will be amended or repealed. The issue in
§ 9(h), it appears, transcends party lines and is rather a question of national
security versus constitutionally secured liberties-whether the danger -to the former
is sufficient to justify infringement of the latter.
For discussions of the non-Communist affidavits and the criminality of
Communism per se, see notes, 23 NoTRF DA=sx LAwYxa 238, 248, and 23 Nom
DAmm LAVryz 577.
Arthur B. Curran, Jr.
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INToXIrATING LIQUORS-LICENSE REVOCATION MUST BE BASED ON PROMUL-
GATED PoricIEs.-Khoury v. Board of Liquor Control of State, ...- Ohio .... , 81
N.E. (2d) 634 (1948). The Ohio Court of Appeals has reversed a ruling of the
Ohio State Liquor Board which revoked a permittee's license for sponsoring
strip tease performances in his establishment. The charge of the Board was that
the acts were lewd and indecent. In defense, the permittee contended that prior
to the actual revocation of the license, he had no knowledge that he was violating
any law or policy of the Board. The court of appeals held that it was not the
intention of the legislature to allow the Board to enforce policies that were neither
brought to the attention of the permittee nor were available as a matter of
record.
The revocation of the license by the Board was based on PAGE'S OHIO GENEAL
CODE §§ 6064-25 (1938).
The Board of Liquor Control may suspend or revoke any permit
issued pursuant to the liquor control act for violation of any applicable
restrictions of this act or any lawful rule or regulation of the Board
or other sufficient cause ....
The Board contended that the strip tease performances were included within
the words, "other sufficient cause", thereby relieving them of the requirement of
the statute which makes it mandatory to publish or give notice to the permit
holder of the rules, regulations and policies under which the act is to be admin-
istered. PAGE'S Oio GENERAL CODE §§ 6064-3 (1938).
The question presented in the Khoury case resolves itself upon the considera-
tion of two factors, first, the interpretation of the words, "other sufficient cause",
and second, and most important, the court of appeal's reaction to the Board's
operating under a policy which has not been communicated to or made available
to the permittee.
The ejusdem generis rule of statutory interpretation is, that where particular
words of description are followed by general terms, the general terms will be
regarded as referring to things of a like class described by the particular terms.
The basis for applying the ejusdem generis rule is that if the legislature had
intended the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, it would have
made no mention of the particular classes.
Applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the words, "other sufficient cause",
in the statute of the instant case, -the particular words pertain to the applicable
restrictions of the act, and the lawful rules, regulations and policies of the Board.
These are available to the public. The reasonable conclusion appears to be that
the words, "other sufficient cause", would mean some law or ordinance which
had been promulgated by lawful authority. State laws and municipal ordinances
would fall into this category.
This conclusion is supported by a recent case decided by the court of appeals.
In Wittenberg v. Board of Liquor Control et al.. .... Ohio ... , 80 N.E. (2d) 711
(1948), a permittee's license was revoked where he was operating, in connection
with a night club, a hotel the rooms of which were being used for immoral pur-
poses. The court sustained the Board's contention that such conduct was within
the meaning of the words, "other sufficient cause". The use of rooms for immoral
purposes was a violation of a state statute, thus unlawful under the laws of the
State of Ohio. PAGE'S Osio GENERAL CODE § 13031 (1938).
In the Khoury case the strip tease performances were not a violation of the
state law or of a municipal ordinance of Cleveland. The evidence showed this
type of entertainment to be carried on in various establishments throughout the
city. No attempt had been made by law enforcement officers to prefer charges
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against the operators, even after many investigations, in which permittee's premises
were included.
The second reason for the court of appeal's overruling of the Liquor Control
Board appears in the following excerpt of the court's opinion:
A permit holder who has invested heavily in his place of business
and has built up good will, although he has no vested rights to retain
a permit, is entitled to a policy from the Liquor Department upon which
he can rely and it should at all times be fair to him.
One may call the motivating force of the court's decision justice, fair play, or
any other comparable synonym. It indicates that the judiciary of the state will
not permit politically infiltrated administrative agencies to forget or disregard the
principle that the people of the United States are to be governed by laws and
policies to which they have access. Further, it indicates that people will be free
to act and carry on their businesses without fear of being put in jeopardy by the
whims of the politicians who predominantly occupy the administrative posts.
In the instant case, the ruling of the Board might have appeared reasonable;
certainly neither the court in its opinion nor the writer contend that strip teasing
is a proper form of entertainment for the public. It is not contended that the
Board could not issue regulations or make known a policy against this type of
entertainment in night clubs whether lewd or not. Regardless of the pragmatic
reasonableness of the Board's ruling, the principle upon which it is based is repug-
nant and cannot be condoned.
The Ohio court is on sound foundations in thus clearly establishing that it
will not tolerate liquor license revocations based on policies which are neither
brought to the attention of the permittee nor available as a matter of record.
John L. Globensky
CONSTTuTONAL LAw-Vo3Nso--TuE RIGHT OF RESmENTS OF LANDs uNPER
FEDERAL CONTROL TO VoTE nV STATE ELEcTIoNs.-Arledge v. Mabry, .... N.M .....
197 P. (2d) 884 (1948). This was a-mandamus proceeding brought by a candi-
date for nomination in a Democratic primary election for the office of County
Judge of Sandoval County, New Mexico, to compel the State Board of Can-
vassers to recanvass the returns in such a manner as to leave out the votes cast
in, and by residents of Precinct No. Seventeen, which lies wholly within the
Los Alamos Project of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The alter-
native writ of mandamus granted by the lower court was made permanent.
Directly involved here is the question whether residents of an area under the
control of the United States are residing within the state within the meaning
of a provision of the state constitution which outlines the requirements for voters.
The court answered this question affirmatively as to part and 'negatively as to
the rest of the voters involved, depending upon the method used by the Federal
Government in acquiring the land on which the voter lived.
The facts show that part of Precinct No. Seventeen was placed under fed-
eral control by condemnation in 1943. This proceeding was authorized by Con-
gress pursuant to its power granted in Clause 17, § 8, Article 1, of the Constitution
of th- United States. The New Mexico statute consenting to this type of federal
acquisition gives exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land "so acquired" to
the United States for all purposes except the service of criminal and civil process
of New Mexico courts. N. M. STAT. §§ 8-202, 8-203 (1941). Justice Sadler,
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who wrote the majority opinion, said that it was not a part of New Mexico, and
the residents thereof are not qualified to vote in the state elections. His decision
on this point seems to be well substantiated by the authority of all the cases
reported in which the issue was involved. In 1811 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the commonwealth could not take cognizance of
criminal acts committed in the town of Springfield, which had been acquired by
the Federal Government as an arsenal by the constitutional method. Common-
wealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811).
The court discussed the problem of the present case in these words:
An objection occurred to the minds of some members of the court,
that if the laws of the commonwealth have no force within this terri-
tory, the inhabitants thereof cannot exercise any civil or political privi-
leges, under the laws of Massachusetts, within the town of Springfield.
We are agreed that such consequence necessarily follows; ..
This dictum was translated into authority by Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass.
58, 1 Metc. 580 (1841) where the following words appear:
. . . we are of opinion, that where the general consent of the Com-
monwealth is given to the purchase of territory by the United States, for
forts and dock yards, and where there is no other condition or reservation
in the act granting such consent, but that of a concurrent jurisdiction
of the State for the service of civil process, and criminal process against
persons charged with crimes committed out of such territory . . . per-
sons residing in such territory do not thereby acquire any elective fran-
chise as inhabitants of the towns in which such territory is situated.
The point was determined in the same manner in Ohio, Sinks v. Reese, 19
Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397 (1869); in New York, In re Town of Highlands,
22 N.Y.S. 137, 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 795 (1892); and South Dakota, McMahon v.
Polk, 10 S.D. 296, 73 N.W. 77, 47 L.R.A. 830 (1897).
The case of Fort Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Lowe, Sheriff, 27 Kan. 749
(1882), involving the question of the right of the state to tax railway property
lying within a federal military reservation, was finally determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Fort Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S.
525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885). It was held that a saving clause in the
Kansas granting act was sufficient to empower the state to levy the tax in
question. The opinion of the court, written by Justice Field, contains some
interesting language. Referring to Opinion of the Justices, Sinks v. Reese, and
other cases decided by state appellate courts, Justice Field said that they were
... sufficient to support the prcposition, which follows naturally from the
language of the Constitution, that no other legislative power than that
of Congress can be exercised over lands, within a state, purchased by the
United States, with her consent, for the purposes designated, and that
such consent, under the Constitution, operates to exclude all other legis-
lative authority.
Two recent Kansas cases holding that the inhabitants of an area acquired from
the state by constitutional method have no right to vote in state-sponsored elec-
tions are Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P. (2d) 946 (1940) and State v.
Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 128 P. (2d) 999 (1942).
As to the inhabitants of the remaining portion of Precinct No. Seventeen,
the court held that they had legal residence in New Mexico because the land
on which their homes were situated had not been acquired by the constitutional
method, but were rather reserved from the public domain for military purposes,
and later turned over to the Atomic Energy Commission. As to such lands the
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New Mexico consent statute does not cede, nor does the United States claim,
exclusive jurisdiction. 30 Stat. 36 (1897), 16 U.S.C. §480 (1946). The Federal
Government occupies and uses such lands in a proprietary capacity only, and
the area remains subject to the jurisdiction of the state, limited only by the
free and effective use of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired.
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930);
Six Companies v. De Vinney, 2 F. Supp. 693 (1933). Justice Sadler concluded
that the votes cast in the primary election by residents of this portion of the
area within the precinct by electors otherwise qualified should have been received
and counted, if legally cast.
The court then held that the votes were not legally cast because the voting
places were on the territory acquired by the constitutional method, and the votes
were therefore not cast in New Mexico as is required by the state constitution.
The court said:
In legal effect, the case is not different from what it would have been
if the polling places had been located and the balloting had occurred in
Colorado or some other state.
The decision of this case seems to be in accord with the line of decisions in
similar cases; indeed, the court could hardly have arrived at any other con-
clusion without departing entirely from rules long established. The case emphasizes
a problem which will assume greater proportions if the Federal Government in-
creases its territorial holdings within the states. The question is especially urgent
in cases like the instant one, in which the state is given the right by Congress
to exact taxes from the inhabitants of the area. The most obvious solution appears
to be in the form of congressional enactment giving the elective franchise to citi-
zens of areas acquired by condemnation or purchase within a state. This action
could be dovetailed with similar provisions of the state granting statute and thus
could be saved an important political right to an increasing number of Americans.
F. H. Hicks
ToaTs-LIHT AS A NuisAnc&.-Amphitheaters, Inc., v. Portland Meadows, a
Corporation, 47 Ore. 77, 198 P. (2d) 847 (1948). Plaintiff, owner of an outdoor
drive-in theater, and defendant, owner of a race-track, built their respective
businesses adjacent to one another in a sparsely settled area outside the city
limits of Portland, Ore. The defendant installed powerful lights to illuminate
his one mile oval track for night racing. Plaintiff's motion picture screen is
832 feet from the nearest of these lights and facing them. Plaintiff proved that
the reflection from these lights is "spilled" onto its screen thereby almost obliterat-
ing the images thereon and that on at least one occasion it has felt required
to refund the price of admission to its patrons. Plaintiff contended that such a
casting of light upon its land is a trespass to real property or in the alternative
a nuisance and asked damages.
In support of its theory of trespass the plaintiff cited Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports Corporation, 55 F. (2d) 201, (C.C.A. 6th 1932), 83 A.L.R. 319; United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946); and Guith
v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E.D.MAch. 1940). The court dis-
tinguished these cases on the ground that they all involved the flight of airplanes,
reflecting the ancient maxim, cujus est colum ejus est usque ad coelum, "as modi-
fied by the rules of privilege set forth in the Restatement." The theory of
trespass by rays of light could not stand on these cases.
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On the contention of nuisance, the court ruled that the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas was so general in its terms as to mean nothing at all.
The court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes in 8 HARv. L. Rav. 3 (1894), as saying
that it is "nothing but a benevolent yearning." The cases cited by the plaintiff
that held that light cast upon another's land could constitute a nuisance all dealt
with such light that would interfere with normal and ordinary use of residential
property. And the test of whether a particular inconvenience would amount to
a nuisance depends upon its effect on a normal person of ordinary habits and
sensibilities. Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73 (1925). The court
stated that "the fact that the plaintiff in this case is in love with darkness rather
than light does not mean that light can be classed as a noxious or generally
injurious instrumentality." The maxim lex non favet delictorum votis was quoted
with approval and applied.
The point on which the instant case turned was the sensitivity to light of
the plaintiff's business. As a conclusion to its arguments the court held that
"a man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbor by applying his own property
to special and delicate uses, whether business or pleasure." The sensitivity of
the motion picture screen was so great that to hold the use to which the defendant
put his land to constitute a nuisance would be placing too great a liability upon
him. The judge delivering the opinion was careful to restrict the decision to
the specific facts of the case before the court and held as a matter of law that
there was no nuisance.
The court in deciding this case for the defendant has allowed one party to
restrict the use of the other's land without compensation. The plaintiff here was
carrying on a lawful business in a lawful manner. The defendant in the pursuit
of his business caused damage of great monetary value to the plaintiff. Under
the ruling of this case such damage was damnum absque injuria. The court
displayed its dislike of the notion that light could be a nuisance in its comment
on National Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388 (1924) cited as
supporting authority by the plaintiff. In that case the court held that the lights
of automobiles using the defendant's filling station, across the street from the
plaintiff's house, constituted a nuisance because under such conditions the plain-
tiffs could not sit on their porch in comfort. The court in the instant case said:
"We doubt if the case would be followed in any state under conditions prevailing
at the present time." There has been no case directly in point with the National
Refining Co. case since it was decided; however, the decision in that case had been
neither criticized nor its soundness questioned until the present opinion criticized it.
The opinion of the instant case stated that this "case differs fundamentally
from other cases, all typical cases of nuisance, in that light is not noxious, but is,
in general, a highly beneficial element.' (Emphasis supplied.) The word "water"
might be substituted for the word "light" in the foregoing quotation, for water,
too, is a beneficial element, but it is very often the subject of nuisance. It would
seem that because generally light is beneficial to man and his wants it does not
follow naturally that such a beneficial element could not be turned into a nuisance.
From the remarks quoted above it seems that under the jurisdiction of the Oregon
Supreme Court the interference by light with one's comfort must be severe
indeed in order to constitute a nuisance.
It is the tendency of many modem decisions to protect the sensitivity of
persons. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608, 191 S.E.
368 (1937); Murphy, Inc., et al. v. Town of Westport et al., 131 Conn. 292, 40
A. (2d) 177 (1944). In State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W.
451 (1923), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said:
It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in their nature.
With the passing of time, social standards conform to new ideals. As a
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race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined, and that which formerly
did not offend cannot now be endured. That which the common law
did not condemn as a nuisance is now frequently outlawed as such by
the written law. This is not because the subject outlawed is of a different
nature, but because our sensibilities have become more refined and our
ideals more exacting.
True, the aesthetic sense of a person and the sensitivity of a motion picture
screen to light are not closely analogous but the language quoted tends to show
that in this case the court could have decided for the plaintiff on as valid grounds
as it did decide for the defendant. Both plaintiff and defendant commenced
operations almost concurrently; neither was of more social utility than the other.
This was not a prayer for an injunction to prohibit the use of the lights by the
defendant but a suit for damages. Had the result of the case been different, the
defendant could have continued using the lights and the plaintiff compensated
for the damage done to him by the plaintiff. The ends of justice would have
been better served by this method rather than by having the plaintiff's business
reduced to a negligible state while the defendant remained free to continue its
damage to its neighbor.
William G. Mahoney, Jr.
EviENcE--CnINAL LAw-S.'-INcqam rATIoN.-State v. Taylor, .... S.C .....
49 S.E. (2d) 289 (1948). Appellant, a Negro about thirty years of age, was
convicted of rape and sentenced to death. The basis of this review was a
recognized duty on the part of the court so to examine the record where the
death penalty is involved to determine if there were any errors affecting the
substantial rights of the accused, even though they were not made the ground
of the appeal.
Appellant denied the crime. From the record it appeared that the following
testimony was admitted in evidence: The morning after the crime the appellant
was taken to jail where, together with four other Negro prisoners, he was re-
quired to line up with his back toward the prosecutrix and was required to
repeat certain words which the prosecutrix had previously stated were used by
the person who assaulted her. After this was done, the prosecutrix immediately
identified the accused as the person who assaulted her-this identification being
made almost solely on the sound of his voice repeating the required words. The
court reversed the judgment of the lower court and granted a new trial on the
grounds that the evidence presented was inadmissable as highly prejudicial.
In arriving at its decision, the court recognized the divergency of views on
the subject of self-incrimination. While pointing out that it is a fundamental
principle of American jurisprudence that no one be compelled to testify against
himself, it also conceded that the decisions of courts do not agree as to the
scope and extent of that privilege. It has been held that a court could not have
required a defendant, while on the stand, to try on a shoe. People v. Mead, 50
Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95 (1883). It has also been held that to compel defendant
in a criminal trial to stand up for identification by a witness violates his con-
stitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination. Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354,
24 So. (2d) 546 (1946). On the other hand it has been held that it did not
violate the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to re-
quire him to stand up in court for identification. Appleby v. State, 221 Ind. 344,
48 N.E. (2d) 646 (1943). In line with this decision was State v. Jones, 188 Wash.
275, 62 P. (2d) 44 (1936), where it was held proper upon cross examination to sub-
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mit to accused for pronunciation words which were similar in sound to the words he
had pronounced at the police station.
It seems well settled that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
is not so broad as to bring a compulsory physical examination of defendant within
the scope of the doctrine, and the testimony of the physician as to what he has
learned in the course of such examination is admissable as evidence. Along this
line of thought is the admissability of blood tests, pictures, and fingerprints as
evidence. The instant case, however, concerns itself with a further refinement
of the doctrine of self-incrimination than mere examinations of personal char-
acteristics, for the accused was compelled, by exhibiting his voice in a required
manner, to perform an affirmative act to aid the state in connecting him with
the crime.
In considering this problem, the court cited a similar situation in which a
defendant was called upon during the trial to stand up and repeat aloud certain
words. The exception to this procedure was dismissed upon the grounds that the
request was acceded to without any objection either by the defendant or his
counsel While stating that it was not the purpose of the court to pass upon the
question until properly presented, the writer of the opinion observed:
To hold this was violation of the clause in Section 9 of the declara-
tion of right which declares the accused "cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself" would in my judgment, be a strained construc-
tion of that instrument.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. St. 369, 9 AtI. 78, 81 (1887). That part of
the opinion bearing on the instant case, while only dicta, serves to emphasize
the disagreement of the courts as to the extent to which the privilege may be
extended, for the majority of opinion seems to be to the contrary.
To compel an accused to merely exhibit his personal characteristics, including
his voice, and to compel him to exhibit them in a manner directly relating to
the crime are two distinctly different acts and not merely a difference in degree.
In the first instance the accused is not being required to be a witness against
himself as he is merely being required to exhibit those characteristics which are
peculiar to him and readily observable, independent of their relation to the
crime; in the second case the accused is being compelled to be a witness against
himself by testifying as to the association of these characteristics with the crime
in question.
Thus in emphasis of the former point it has been held to be not improper
to inspect appellant and to identify him from his appearance as well as his
voice where the accused was merely required to converse with the witness in
order for her to identify him. Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. R. 272, 162
S.W. (2d) 706 (1942).
As to the latter point, which concerns the principle involved in the present
case, the court cited State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81, 35 A.L.R. 1227
(1924), as the controlling case. While not involving exactly the same factual
situation it correctly states the problem involved, which according to the court
was that, "The line of cleaverage is whether the proposed evidence is the testi-
mony of the defendant or evidence in itself, unaided by any statement of the
defendant." There the question concerned the admissability of the testimony
of the sheriff to the effect that he compelled the defendant to place her foot in
footprints in a potato patch at the scene of the crime and that she would not
do it in the right way.
The court there made the distinction between the sheriff obtaining the shoe
and comparing it with the track, and of forcing the defendant to place her foot
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in the track. In the first instance the shoe and comparison of the shoe with
the track were not the testimony of the defendant, but of the sheriff and the
defendant was not bearing witness against herself as she was not necessary to
establish its authenticity, identity, or origin, which facts were established by
the testimony of the sheriff independent of the defendant. In answering the second
question the court said: "If the conformity had been perfect that fact would
have appeared from the enforced conduct of the defendant, clearly testimonial
compulsion."
In considering the decision of State v. Griffin as controlling in this decision,
the court in the present case said,
It is difficult to draw any distinction between compelling a defendant
to put his foot in a track at the scene of the crime in order to afford a
basis for comparison and requiring a defendant to repeat certain words
used at the scene of the crime in order to establish a basis for identity.
The court thus upheld the fundamental privilege against self-incrimination by
extending it to compulsory incriminating matter gained by word of mouth, and
correctly so.
John B. Palmer
TORTS-PROXcrsATE CAusF-AuToxoBai -- Galbrafth v. Levin, Galbraith v.
Cohen, .... Mass ..... , 81 N.E. (2d) 560 (1948). These were two tort actions for
personal injuries arising out of the same fact situation, one action against the
owner of the automobile involved in the accident, the other against the car
owner's agent. The defendants had left the illegally registered automobile un-
attended, and with the keys over the sun visor, in violation of statute which
prohibited the leaving of automobiles unlocked and unattended. MAss. G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 90, §§ 3, 9, 13 (1946). A short time after so leaving the car, it
was stolen, and the thief, operating the vehicle in a negligent manner, struck
and injured a pedestrian, who was the plaintiff in these actions. The main ques-
tion involved was whether the conduct of the defendants could be found to have
been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, or, on the other hand, whether
the conduct of the thief was a superseding intervening cause which the defendant
could not be expected to have reasonably foreseen or anticipated. The Massa-
chusetts court, in adopting the latter view and refusing to find liability for the
defendant's conduct, expressly overruled the case of Malloy v. Newman, 310
Mass. 269, 37 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1941), which involved essentially the same facts,
but in which an opposite result was reached. By so overruling the Malloy
case, the court at last cleared up the confusion existing in its own state decisions
respecting this point of law. This unfortunate situation had arisen out of the
previous cases concerning this problem of tort liability in which the Massachu-
setts courts had indulged in the game of picayunish "distinguishing" of cases
where, in truth, there was no essential basis for distinguishing them. By way
of illustration: The case of Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E.
778 (1927), first denied liability on the same general fact pattern, the only
salient fact difference being that the car was properly registered; the defendant
in that case, as in all the other cases considered herein, had violated a statute
forbidding leaving automobiles unattended and unlocked. In Sullivan v. Griffin,
318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E. (2d) 330 (1945), involving essentially the same facts,
the court followed the reasoning and the holding in the Slater case. Meanwhile,
in the Malloy case, which was decided after the Slater case but before the Sullivan
case, the court had found the defendant liable. In all of these similar fact pat-
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terns, the mere point of compliance or non-compliance of the defendants with
the vehicle registration statutes would not seem to be a substantial basis for
distinguishing the cases, particularly since the original conduct of the defendants
in all of these cases consisted of negligence arising out of the violation of the
statute respecting the leaving of cars unattended and unlocked, aside from the
point of vehicle registration.
It would seem that the most forceful objections to any cases in this same
general category where the courts would find liability on the part of the de-
fendants would arise upon application of the tort liability theory of proximate
cause. In order for the plaintiffs to recover in these cases, it should be shown
first of all that the defendant was negligent, and second, that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See 158 A.L.R. 1374,
1375. It would not ordinarily be difficult to prove negligence in these cases, since
violation of a statute would likely be held to be negligence per se or at least
strong evidence of negligence. Satisfying the requirements of proximate cause
in these cases would seem to present a more difficult problem. However, it Is
interesting at this juncture to note a recent Illinois case directly in point, Oster-
gard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. (2d) 537 (1948), in which it was
held that the defendant-owner's conduct constituted negligence, and, further, was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, rendering the defendant liable there-
for. The court decided that the defendant had a duty to foresee the conse-
quences of his negligence, and that if the defendant's conduct in violating the
statute respecting the leaving of vehicles unattended and unlocked brought about
the very harm which the statute was calculated to prevent, then the defendant's
conduct was the legal cause of the harm. The Illinois case, as well as those
cases from other jurisdictions which have followed the same rule, Ross v. Hart-
man, 139 F. (2d) 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370 (App. D. C. 1944), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790, 64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1080 (1944); cf. Maggiore v. Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Service, La. App., 150 So. 394 (1933), would seem to strain the theory
of proximate cause and place too high a standard of reasonable foreseeability on
the conduct of individuals. Ordinarily, the criminal act of a third person should
preclude recovery against the defendant in these cases, even though the condi-
tion for the subsequent injury or damage to the plaintiff was caused by the
negligence of the defendant. 38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 71 (1941). The criminal
act of a third person is generally held to be a superseding cause, and becomes
itself the proximate cause of the injury. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, § 448, comment (b)
(1934), Thus it would seem that the better rule, which generally denies the
liability of the negligent owner of the automobile or his agent, in these cases,
has been adopted by the Massachusetts court, .as well as by the courts of some
few other jurisdictions in which this point of law has been considered. Castay v.
Katz & Besthoff, La. App., 148 So. 76 (1933); Lotito v. Kyriacus, 74 N.Y.S.
(2d) 599, 272 App. Div. 635 (1948).
E. A. Steffen, Jr.
WILLS-CoNsTRUCTION-DYING WITHOUT IssuF.-Stagg et al. v. Phenix et al.,
Ill ..... , 81 N.E. (2d) 565 (1948). This recent decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court illustrates the cardinal rule of will construction that the intent of the
testator as gathered from the unambiguous wording of the whole instrument
will govern the court in the interpretation of that instrument.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: In 1893, testators Jane A. and
Daniel B. Phenix executed a joint will. The first clause of the will provided for
a life estate in the survivor of the two testators. Jane A. Phenix died in 1906
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and Daniel B. Phenix died in 1913. Two sons, Bardwell D. Phenix and William H.
Phenix, devisees under the will, were the sole surviving heirs. The third clause
of the will read as follows:
3. We give and devise to our son, Bardwell D. Phenix the following
described real estate, (describing the real estate); Provided, that if the
said Bardwell D. Phenix shall die without issue, leaving surviving him
no child or children as his heir or heirs, then upon his death all the said
described real estate devised to him shall go, and we give and devise
the same, to the children of our son William H. Phenix then living, or
that may be thereafter born.
The sixth clause had a similar provision as regarding one-half of the personalty.
William H. Phenix died in 1940 and Bessie L. Stagg and Aura A. Timmons, both
children of William H. Phenix, deceased, filed their bill for partition and for a
construction of the above clauses. Bardwell D. Phenix, the appellant, was an
old man who had been twice married and had no children. Bardwell contended
that by the clause in question he received an absolute fee upon his survival of
the life tenant and the limitation over was to take place only in the event that
he predeceased the life tenant with no issue him surviving. The appellees on the
other hand contended that Bardwell received a determinable fee and that they
as the children of William Phenix were executory devisees. They further main-
tained that the ascertainment of thg fulfillment of the condition should be deter-
mined as of the death of Bardwell.
Both contentions were based upon rules of construction as set out in Smith
et al. v. Shephard et al., 370 Ill. 491, 19 N.E. (2d) 368 (1939), and Lachenmyer
et al. v. Gehlback, 266 Ill. 11, 107 N.E. 202 (1914). The rules as set out in
Smith v. Shephard, are as follows:
(1) Where, by will, an estate is devised to one person simpliciter, and
in case of his death to another, the contingency of "his death" refers to
the death of the devisee during the lifetime of the testator, and such
devisee has an absolute estate in fee simple if he survives the testator....
(2) Where, by will, an estate is devised to one person, and in case
of his death to another, if the contingency of "his death" is coupled with
a condition such as "without issue," "without heirs," "without heirs of
his body," "without husband or wife," or similar conditions, making the
contingency upon which the estate vests, in itself uncertain, the devise
over to the ultimate beneficiary takes effect upon the death of the first
taker, under the circumstances indicated, at any time, whether before or
after the death of the testator....
(3) There is another class of cases where the devise is not immediate
but is of a future interest to take effect in possession upon a termination
of an intervening particular estate. In such case, unles the will shows
the testator intended to refer to a different date than the termination
of the particular estate, the rule is that the gift over will take effect if
the contingency happens at any time before the termination of the par-
ticular estate, and death without issue means death without issue before
the termination of the particular estate....
Baidwell Phenix contended that his case fell within rule three as set out in the
Shephard case and argued that since he had survived the life estate of the sur-
vivor he took an absolute fee and the condition was discharged. The appellees,
on the other hand, suggested that the second rule was applicable and hence the
condition could not be fulfilled until the death of Bardwell. The court disposed
of the contention of the appellant by showing that the testators by another
clause expressly provided that the gift over should not take effect until the death
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of the survivor. The court further pointed out that even if the testator had
not so directed, rule three would still not be applicable. There never was a
life estate in the whole of the property devised sifice the joint will gave only a
life estate to the survivor of those lands of which the other owned. The re-
mainder of those lands the survivor owned in fee, but which lands passed at his
death by reason of his earlier execution of the joint will. The court held that
rule two of the Shephard case was not needed to arrive at a decision and hence
reliance thereon was not necessary. In holding that Bardwell Phenix took a
conditional fee subject to be divested at any time before or after the death of
the testators the court considered several factors: The evident meaning of the
language used, the fact that the testators contemplated Bardwell surviving them
as indicated by their appointment of him as an executor, and thirdly, the fact
that by the clause in question the testators designated the children of William
Phenix that were then living, meaning those living at the death of Bardwell.
Any child dying before Bardwell could not take under that clause, and as pointed
out by the court, "it would be unreasonable to construe the intention of the
testators to fix the time of death at an earlier date when the person to whom
the gift over is to be made could not be determined."
The use of the term "conditional fee" is appropriate to describe the estate
that Bardwell took. The failure of issue, him surviving, would operate as a
condition subsequent and the executory devise over completed the divestiture as
contemplated. It is not to be confused with the old conditional fee existing before
the Statute De Donis. A treatment of this point is dealt with in Tiedman's
Real Property, wherein it is stated:
Whenever a fee is so qualified, as to be made to determine, or liable
to be defeated, at the happening of some contingent event or act, the fee
is said to be base, qualified, or determinable. There are four classes of
such fees, viz.: fee upon condition, fee upon limitation, a conditional
limitation, and a fee conditional at common law. . . . Tra s , RPAL
Paopirzy § 44 (2d ed. 1892).
Thus, it could be said that Bardwell took a conditional fee, or as stated in the
quotation above, a fee upon condition.
At first glance it would appear unnecessary that the court should have gone
into such a detailed discussion of the intent factor in view of the fact that by
following rule two of the Shephard case the same ultimate conclusion could have
been reached. The court, however, appeared intent upon correcting the error
of the appellees' reasoning, though not their ultimate conclusion. The appellees
relied on a rule of construction and sought to impress it upon the court as though
it were a rule of law. Though, as in this case, it would not have been an
injustice to have followed that rule, it would have opened the door to a looser
interpretation of a testator's intent and in time could have abrogated the intent
factor entirely.
E. L. Twohey
